While Rule 26 (b) (4) (C) provides that “communications between the party’s attorney and any witness required to provide a report” may be protected work product, it limits that protection “to the extent that the communications: (i) relate to compensation for the expert’s study or testimony; (ii) identify facts or data that the party’s attorney provided and that the expert considered in forming the opinions to be expressed; or (iii) identify assumptions that the party’s attorney provided and that the expert relied on in forming the opinions to be expressed.”
Oct 06, 2010 · Addressing an issue of first impression in Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Superior Court recently concluded that an attorney's communications with a testifying expert are discoverable. This important decision puts Pennsylvania law squarely at odds with the newly amended Federal Rule 26 (b) (4), set to take effect December 1, 2010, which prohibits …
Understand what attorney-expert communications are protected, and which ones are not with the new rules.The outcome of many cases turns on the use of experts. ... You will come to know the different ways that the law distinguishes between in-house experts, and those who are specially retained for the litigation, and between testifying and ...
Oct 06, 2010 · In camera review is unnecessary since communications between counsel and a testifying expert are not protected by the attorney work-product privilege. The practical effect of this decision is clear: Counsel in Pennsylvania state court should tread lightly in communications with testifying experts.
Dec 12, 2016 · While Rule 26(b)(4)(C) provides that “communications between the party’s attorney and any witness required to provide a report” may be protected work product, it limits that protection “to the extent that the communications: (i) relate to compensation for the expert’s study or testimony; (ii) identify facts or data that the party’s attorney provided and that the …
When an expert is hired to provide assistance in anticipation of litigation, rather than providing legal advice, the attorney-client privilege will not apply. This is because the expert is not being called to assist an attorney in determining a proper course of action, wherein privilege attaches, but rather the attorney is being called in to protect a client’s financial or liberty interests through advocacy. However, the communications may still be protected under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26.
A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b) . . . [1]
Experts are divided into two categories under the Federal Rules of Evidence: testifying experts, and “experts employed only for trial preparation,” also known as consulting experts. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 26 (b) provides for the protection of facts known to a consulting expert as follows:
The disparity between the treatment of a consulting expert and a testifying expert is clear—a testifying expert must disclose things a consulting expert does not have to disclose. When determining whether to identify an expert as a testifying expert or a consulting expert, it is a good idea to consider how one intends to use the expert, ...
Despite the fact an interpreter is indeed a third party, whose presence would normally negate the attorney-client privilege, an interpreter is essential for the communication between attorney and client, so the attorney can render legal advice. So, too, are some experts essential for communication between attorney and client, ...
To ensure that the lawyer’s communications with the expert remain work product only, contact may need to take place in person more than over the phone or through messaging applications. Additionally, it is crucial to keep the contact on a professional level at all times.
This relates to the communications between the expert or other witness and the lawyer even if he or she provides only a report. This is work product protected against use by the other lawyer in the case as long as the communication has an association with the compensation the expert’s study or testimony will provide to the professional.
The work product rules prevent another legal party from taking advantage of using materials prepared for or by a lawyer in the course of a legal investigation. This is especially important for litigation purposes, and if the resources become found during the initial processes, they are not usable against the legal party. This is crucial for experts that provide testing, reports and details about the case for a lawyer. The professional’s investigation and procedures into the subject matter are not subject to use by the other legal team unless it is with a cross-examination. This may involve communications, written materials and contact with the expert.
In addition to the use of expert witness testimony at deposition and trial, many attorneys work with “consulting” experts who do not testify.
Many lawyers remember being cautioned, as a first-year associate, that “anything you say to an expert is discoverable.” In addition, experts – even non-testifying experts – are third parties to the attorney-client relationship. The combination of these two facts often leads lawyers to presume that communications with consulting experts are not protected by privilege rules and are subject to discovery.
In practice, however, many courts have held that attorney-client privilege generally works to protect communications between the attorney and consultants when: The communication occurs for the purposes of obtaining or dispensing legal advice, and.
Although communications with consulting experts are generally protected by attorney-client privilege, a number of exceptions exist. For example, if the expert, an attorney, or the client disclose the expert’s opinion to a third party who lacks a common legal interest, a court may hold that the privilege no longer applies. (The privilege may still apply, however, if the information is disclosed to a third party who is also assisting with the case.)
Because Rule 26 protections for work product shared with non-testifying experts are more stringent than protections involving testifying experts, it is worthwhile to distinguish between testifying and non-testifying experts early in the investigation and discovery process.
testifying expert is a witness who is specifically qualified to “assist the trier of fact to understand evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”85 In federal courts, expert testimony is governed by Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 703, and 704, under which expert witnesses are given greater latitude to offer opinions and testify to a wider spectrum of topics than fact witnesses are.86 Disclosure of privileged information, however, is controlled under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B).87 Under the pre-2010 amendment of Rule 26, the vast majority of federal courts required the disclosure of all privileged informa-tion considered by a testifying expert.88 Disclosure requirements changed with the 1993 amendment to the rule, and significantly increased a litigant’s ability to obtain expert discovery.89 The 1970 amendment required the disclosure of all information “relied” upon by the expert. The 1993 amendment required a party to produce all information “considered” by a testifying expert in form-ing an opinion.90 Several courts noted that the 1970 amendment was far less inclusive of information than the 1993 amendment.91The change in the text of the rule and the admonition that appears in the Advisory Committee Notes92 broadened the scope of information that must be disclosed. The decision in In re Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.93 provides the seminal example of how courts across the country have treated the privileged communications that have been shared with testifying experts. In re Pioneer involved a suit for breach of contract, patent infringement, and misappropria-tion of trade secrets.94 Throughout the discovery process, Monsanto sought information regarding a merger in which Pioneer was involved and shared documents with their testifying expert.95 Specifically, Monsanto deposed Pio-neer’s in-house counsel, which Pioneer designated as its representative pur-suant to Rule 30(b)(6).96 During the deposition, Monsanto sought information relating to the analysis of the financial benefits stemming from the merger, to which Pioneer’s in-house counsel invoked the attorney-client privilege in some instances.97In response, Monsanto moved to compel Pioneer’s in-house counsel to respond to the deposition questions.98 The district court granted the motion, stating that it was persuaded, “limited to the facts and circumstances pre-sented in this instance, that, if ever privileged, the protection applying to these opinions and communications has been waived by defendant’s disclosure of the opinions to expert witnesses.”99 The Federal Circuit agreed100 and stated:
The interpretation of the post-1993 Rule 26 as expressed by the courts in In re Pioneer and Synthes is the nearly unanimous position among courts nationwide with respect to attorney-client privilege.108 But courts continue to have diffi-culty coming to an agreement on the extent to which work product shared with a testifying expert is discoverable.109 The majority of courts agree that work product shared with a testifying expert is discoverable.110 A minority of cases, however, following the pre-1993 amendment case Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp.,111 hold that the 1993 amendment was insufficiently specific to cause waiver with respect to “core” work product protections afforded to the legal conclusions and analysis of lawyers, even when shared with a testifying expert.112 The 2010 amendment to Rule 26, however, should end application of the majority rule as we know it. Indeed, that is the view expressed in the Committee Notes to Rule 26(a)(2(B): “This amendment is intended to alter the outcome in cases that have relied on the 1993 formulation in requiring disclosure of all attorney-expert communications and draft reports.”113
Prior to 1993, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 required the disclosure of expert opinions by way of interrogatory answers.77 The amendments effec-tive in 1993 changed the manner by which expert opinions were disclosed: the rule required (1) a report “of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them,”78 (2) disclosure of “the data or other information considered by the witness in forming [the opinions],”79 and (3) the deposition of the expert.80 Before 1993, courts were split on the breadth of the informa-tion discoverable from testifying experts. Since the 1993 amendments to Rule 26, there is near unanimity of opinion among federal courts that disclosing attorney-client communications to an independent expert witness waives the privilege.81 State courts have generally followed suit.82 Several courts, however, have based their decisions on the pre-1993 version of the Federal Rules.83 Addi-tionally, several states have discovery rules that mirror the pre-1993 federal version of Rule 26.84As noted above, Rule 26 was again amended, effective December 1, 2010. The Advisory Committee comments state the purpose of the amendments: