In a case out of Louisiana, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied a Black man's request to have incriminating statements thrown out after ruling that asking for "a lawyer, dog," wasn't a request for legal counsel.
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Last week, the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected this request by a margin of 6-1, claiming that the way Demesme asked for a lawyer was “ambiguous.”. Meaning, it wasn’t clear if Demesme was ...
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The District Court denied defendants’ exceptions, citing Louisiana Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(h)(1), which states: “A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer’s liability to a client for malpractice unless the client is independently represented in making the agreement.” The court
Ferguson, Judgement, Decided May 18, 1896; Records of the Supreme Court of the United States; Record Group 267; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163, #15248, National Archives. The ruling in this Supreme Court case upheld a Louisiana state law that allowed for "equal but separate accommodations for the white and colored races."Feb 8, 2022
Louisiana, 590 U.S. ___ (2020), was a U.S. Supreme Court decision in which the Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires that guilty verdicts for criminal trials be unanimous.
But on the same day, another appeals court in a different part of the state ruled the opposite, reversing a lower court's ruling that found the 2020 Supreme Court decision Ramos v. Louisiana fully retroactive.Nov 11, 2021
In dissent, John Marshall Harlan argued that the Constitution was color-blind and that the United States had no class system. Accordingly, all citizens should have equal access to civil rights.
Louisiana law at the time permitted a 10–2 jury verdict in non-capital cases. Ramos appealed to the Louisiana Court of Appeal, arguing that Louisiana's law permitting non-unanimous jury verdicts in non-capital cases violated his equal protection rights. See State v. Ramos, 231 So.Feb 17, 2021
2020Ramos v. Louisiana / Date decided
When there are insufficient jurors voting one way or the other to deliver either a guilty or not guilty verdict, the jury is known as a “hung jury” or it might be said that jurors are “deadlocked”. The judge may direct them to deliberate further, usually no more than once or twice.
Abstract: The “watershed” doctrine gives prisoners a constitutional basis to reopen their cases based on a new due process protection that would have made a difference had it been announced before their appeals were exhausted.Jun 21, 2016
A hung jury, also called a deadlocked jury, is a judicial jury that cannot agree upon a verdict after extended deliberation and is unable to reach the required unanimity or supermajority. Hung jury usually results in the case being tried again.
Justice John Marshall HarlanThe one lonely, courageous dissenter against the Plessy v. Ferguson decision was a Kentuckian, Associate Justice John Marshall Harlan. At issue was a Louisiana law compelling segregation of the races in rail coaches.
Rejecting Plessy's argument that his constitutional rights were violated, the Supreme Court ruled that a law that “implies merely a legal distinction” between white people and Black people was not unconstitutional.Jan 20, 2022
Supreme Court of the United States Decision: With seven votes for Ferguson and one vote against, the Supreme Court ruled that mandatory racial segregation was not in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
[1] Lawyers are subject to discipline when they violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so through the acts of another, as when they request or instruct an agent to do so on the lawyer’s behalf. Paragraph (a), however, does not prohibit a lawyer from advising a client concerning action the client is legally entitled to take.
The sanctions appropriate for a violation of paragraph (a) of this rule are those applicable to the underlying rule that the lawyer has violated, attempted to violate or assisted another in violating. See ABA Stds. for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions appx. 1 (1986).
The Louisiana Supreme Court has noted that while Rule 8.4 (d) typically applies to “litigation-related misconduct, ” it is broader in scope. See In re Downing, 930 So. 2d 897, 904 n.5 (La. 2006). The rule also “reaches conduct that is uncivil, undignified, or unprofessional, regardless of whether it is directly connected to a legal proceeding.” Id. For example, a lawyer received a thirty-day suspension for disrupting a court proceeding by “using vulgarities in the courtroom.” See In re Sanford, 214 So. 3d 841 (La. 2017). Another lawyer received a public reprimand after raising his fist and threatening to punch the opposing counsel. In re Spears, 290 So. 3d 645 (La. 2020).Although, not a Louisiana case, a North Carolina “activist” lawyer purporting to represent an “occupy movement” engaged in conduct “prejudicial to the administration of justice” by exclaiming to a magistrate “what the fu** is going on around here.” See N.C. State Bar v. Foster, No. COA17-443 (N.C. Dec. 19, 2017).
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) Violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;
Third, on August 8, 2016, the ABA House of Delegates amended Model Rule 8.4 to include a broad anti-discrimination and anti-harassment provision . The amendment, which was sponsored by several ABA groups, 2 added this new paragraph (g) to the black-letter of Rule 8.4: It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: . . .
Lawyers also should be mindful of their professional obligations under Rule 6.1 to provide legal services to those who are unable to pay, and their obligation under Rule 6.2 not to avoid appointments from a tribunal except for good cause. See Rule 6.2 (a), (b) and (c).
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel traditionally does not allow itself to be used as a collection agent for the vendors and creditors of lawyer. In so doing, the office has relied upon the Louisiana Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in In re Bible, 842 So. 2d 729 (La. 2003). In that case, the hearing committee opined that “the failure to pay an invoice of a court reporter does not constitute action that is prejudicial to the administration of justice even though Respondent has no justification for not paying the invoice.” Otherwise, the disciplinary counsel “would become a collection agency for creditors of attorneys.” Id. at 736.
Jesse Jay Montejo argues that police violated his Sixth Amendment rights by interrogating him after a lawyer had been appointed to him but before having the opportunity to meet his counsel. In Michigan v. Harvey, the Supreme Court decided that, once legal counsel has been either obtained or requested, any statement made by the defendant is inadmissible in court. Moreover, police are not permitted to instigate pre-trial questioning once the accused has a lawyer. The purpose of this rule goes to the essence of the adversarial nature of American trial system: by ensuring that the defendant's right to rely on his counsel remains intact, his counsel serves as an effective "medium," isolating the defendant from the prosecuting authorities of the State. Montejo was appointed counsel at the 72-hour hearing, the very purpose of which is to assign counsel to indigent defendants. The Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel attaches when judicial appointment proceedings, such as Louisiana's 72-hour hearing, have been conducted. Furthermore, the detectives cannot claim ignorance of counsel's appointment: knowledge of the actions of one state actor is imputed to another. . Consequently, the incriminating evidence that the detectives discovered during this illicit interrogation are inadmissible in court.
On the evening of September 5, 2002, Patricia Ferrari found her husband, Lewis Ferrari ("Ferrari"), murdered in the kitchen of their Slidell, Louisiana home. That day, between approximately 4:15 and 5:30 p.m., several neighbors saw a blue van with a "distinctive chrome cattle bar," owned by the defendant, Jesse Jay Montejo ("Montejo"), in the neighborhood and parked outside Ferrari's home. A coroner estimated that Ferrari had been shot between 4 and 5 p.m.Police questioned Montejo, an acquaintance of one of Ferrari's employees, Jerry Moore, on September 6 and 7, 2002. During questioning, Montejo admitted that he shot Ferrari when Ferrari unexpectedly returned home, interrupting Montejo's burglary.
The State argues that Montejo's reading of passive appointment runs against the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. It points out that the Court has specifically noted that "the assertion of the right to counsel is a significant event." The State points out that the Court has repeatedly taken special notice of defendants actively seeking to exercise the right to have counsel. Moreover, looking at the other side of the coin, the State notes that the Court explicitly rejected the argument that the mere existence of an attorney-client relationship triggered the right to counsel.
Prior to accompanying the police, Montejo was Mirandized a second time. At trial, a detective testified that, during the excursion, Montejo told him that he did not have an attorney, but Montejo testified that he had told the detective that he had an attorney and that the detective had responded that he was mistaken.
Firstly, while the Constitution protects individual rights, it "does not negate society's interest" in having the police conduct interrogations. Admissions of guilt are not only desirable, but also "essential to society's compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law.".
Does the sound of silence answer in the affirmative, in the negative, or not at all? The question at hand is whether Sixth Amendment rights attached to a defendant who has been appointed counsel, but who has not actively expressed or asserted his right to have such counsel. In this case, Jesse Jay Montejo admitted during initial questioning to shooting Lewis Ferrari during an attempted burglary. Montejo, an indigent, was appointed counsel at a 72-hour hearing. However, within hours after appointment, police returned to Montejo's cell to continue interrogation, something which is strictly barred once counsel has been assigned. During that interrogation, Montejo wrote a confession letter, which was later admitted as evidence. At issue in this case is whether that letter should have been suppressed because it was obtained in violation of Montejo's Sixth Amendment rights. Louisiana argues Sixth Amendment rights may not be passively applied but that a defendant must voluntarily assert his choice to have counsel appointed. Montejo argues that this is nonsensical and that presence at an appointment proceeding is enough.