Brief Fact Summary. The petitioner Danny Escobedo asked to speak with his lawyer while in police custody but before being formally charged and was denied. Synopsis of Rule of Law.
Danny Escobedo (born c. 1937) was a Chicago petitioner in the Supreme Court case of Escobedo v. Illinois, which established a criminal suspect's right to remain silent and have an attorney present during questioning.
Escobedo's brother-in-law Manuel was shot on the night of January 19, 1960 and Escobedo was arrested the next day, in the morning, at 2:30 a.m, without a warrant to be questioned.
The statements Escobedo made to police, after being denied counsel, should not be allowed into evidence, the attorney argued. An attorney on behalf of Illinois argued that states retain their right to oversee criminal procedure under the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
Petitioner moved both before and during trial to suppress the incriminating statement, but the motions were denied. Petitioner was co victed of murder and he appealed the conviction.
The critical question in this case is whether, under the circumstances, the refusal by the police to honor petitioner's request to consult with his lawyer during the course of an interrogation constitutes a denial of 'the Assistance of Counsel' in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as 'made obligatory upon the States by the Fourtee th Amendment,' Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342, 83 S.Ct. 792, 795, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, and thereby renders inadmissible in a state criminal trial any incriminating statement elicited by the police during the interrogation.
In the early hours of the next morning, at 2:30 a.m., petitioner was arrested without a warrant and interrogated. Petitioner made no statement to the police and was released at 5 that afternoon pursuant to a state court writ of habeas corpus obtained by Mr. Warren Wolfson, a lawyer who had been retained by petitioner. 3.
There is testimony by the police that during the interrogation, petitioner, a 22-year-old of Mexican extraction with no record of previous experience with the police, 'was handcuffed' 3 in a standing position and that he 'was nervous, he had circles under his eyes and he was upset' and was 'agitated' because 'he had not slept well in over a week.'
Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 78 S.Ct. 1287, does not compel a contrary result. In that case the Court merely rejected the absolute rule sought by petitioner, that 'every state denial of a request to contact counsel (is) an infringement of the constitutional right without regard to the circumstances of the case.' Id., 357 U.S., at 440, 78 S.Ct., at 1292. (Emphasis in original.) In its place, the following rule was announced:
The New York Court of Appeals, whose decisions this Court cited with approval in Massiah, 377 U.S. 201, at 205, 84 S.Ct. 1199, at 1202, has recently recognized that, under circumstances such as those here, no meaningful distinction can be drawn between interrogation of an accused before and after formal indictment. In People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841, 193 N.E.2d 628, that court, in an opinion by Judge Fuld, held that a 'confession taken from a defendant, during a period of detention (prior to indictment), after his attorney had requested and been denied access to him' could not be used against him in a criminal trial. 6 Id., 13 N.Y.2d at 151, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 842, 193 N.E.2d at 629. The court observed that it 'would be highly incongruous if our system of justice permitted the district attorney, the lawyer representing the State, to extract a confession from the accused while his own lawyer, seeking to speak with him was kept from him by the police.' Id., 13 N.Y.2d at 152, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 842, 193 N.E.2d at 629. 7
The interrogation here was conducted before petitioner was formally indicted. But in the context of this case, that fact should make no difference. When petitioner requested, and was denied, an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, the investigation had ceased to be a general investigation of 'an unsolved crime.'.
Not allowing someone to speak with an attorney, and not advising them of their right to remain silent after they have been arrested and before they have been interrogated is a denial of assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
A law enforcement system that relies too much on the confession is more subject to abuses than one that depends on evidence obtained through skillful investigation. The result here recognizes this idea.
The incriminating statements he made must thus not be admitted into evidence. A law enforcement system that relies too much on the confession is more subject to abuses than one that depends on evidence obtained through skillful investigation. The result here recognizes this idea. Points of Law - for Law School Success.
Danny Escobedo was arrested and taken to a police station for questioning. Over several hours, the police refused his repeated requests to see his lawyer. Escobedo’s lawyer sought unsuccessfully to consult with his client. Escobedo subsequently confessed to murder.
Danny had requested to see his attorney.
Was Escobedo denied the right to counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment ?
On the evening of January 19th, the petitioner’s brother-in-law was shot in the garage behind his home.
In the early morning hours of January 20, 1960 police interrogated Danny Escobedo in relation to a fatal shooting. Police released Escobedo after he refused to make a statement.
Arguments. An attorney representing Escobedo argued that police had violated his right to due process when they prevented him from speaking with an attorney. The statements Escobedo made to police, after being denied counsel, should not be allowed into evidence, the attorney argued.
During the interrogation, Escobedo was handcuffed and left standing. Police later testified that he seemed nervous and agitated. At one point during the interrogation, police allowed Escobedo to confront DiGerlando. Escobedo admitted knowledge of the crime and exclaimed that DiGerlando had killed the victim.
On behalf of the majority, Justice Goldberg wrote that it was important for suspects to have access to an attorney during interrogation because it is the likeliest time for the suspect to confess. Suspects should be advised of their rights before making incriminating statements, he argued.
Justice Stewart argued that the start of the judicial process is marked by indictment or arraignment, not custody or questioning. By requiring access to counsel during interrogation, the Supreme Court jeopardized the integrity of the judicial process, Justice Stewart wrote.
The majority found that someone suspected of a crime has the right to speak with an attorney during a police interrogation under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution . Fast Facts: Escobedo v. Illinois.
Escobedo admitted knowledge of the crime and exclaimed that DiGerlando had killed the victim. Escobedo’s attorney moved to suppress statements made during this interrogation before and during trial. The judge denied the motion both times.
Twenty-two year old Escobedo was taken into custody for questioning regarding a murder. Escobedo repeatedly asked for his attorney and was denied. Another suspect, Di Gerlando, was at the station and told officers that Escobedo shot and killed the victim. Police then brought both men into the same room where Escobedo confessed.
Case summary for Escobedo v. Illinois: 1 Twenty-two year old Escobedo was taken into custody for questioning regarding a murder. Escobedo repeatedly asked for his attorney and was denied. 2 Another suspect, Di Gerlando, was at the station and told officers that Escobedo shot and killed the victim. Police then brought both men into the same room where Escobedo confessed. 3 Escobedo was never informed of his right to remain silent and was later convicted of murder at trial. Escobedo appealed his conviction. 4 The Court held that once the process “shifts from investigatory to accusatory — when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession — our adversary system begins to operate, and……the accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer.”
At this point, Escobedo was in custody and requested his lawyer several times. The Court held that such a police’s refusal violates Escobedo’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel and renders the subsequent incriminating statement inadmissible.
However, this very reasoning fortifies the argument that the right to counsel should attach early on in the judicial process to prevent injustice.
The Court held that once the process “shifts from investigatory to accusatory — when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession — our adversary system begins to operate, and……the accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer .”
This case stressed the importance of permitting the accused to utilize his Sixth Amendment constitutional right to an attorney once the initial police inquiry shifts from investigatory to accusatory in nature.
Escobedo was arrested as a murder suspect and taken down to the police station for questioning. En Route, Escobedo requested to speak to his lawyer on the way to the station in addition to several other times once at the station.