Fuller's natural law philosophy is not complete unless it is presented under both aspects. Under the substantive rubric, Fuller probes the meaning of law as it relates to the proper ends to be sought through legal rules.
Fuller's Natural Law View Professor Fuller's initial (1940) sweep- ing critique of positivism was delivered as a series of three lectures, later bound in a small volume and published under the title of The Law in Quest of Itself."' Within the next year over twenty reviews of this 147- page work had appeared.
Lon Fuller observed that a utilitarian philosophy has a major influence on legal positivism. Fuller believed that utilitarianism encourages the notion that means are a mere matter of expediency. However, he believes that means and ends stand in a relationship of pervasive interaction.
After acquiring his Doctor of Laws degree from Stanford in 1926, Professor Fuller taught at the University of Oregon Law School (1926-1928), the University of Illinois College of Law (1928-1931) and Duke University Law School (1931-1939). Since 1940, Professor Fuller has been asso-
Yet Fuller points out, some of the most signifi- cant facts involve intangible realities, such as moral facts, lying not in behavior pat- terns, but in attitudes and conceptions of rightness.'- Professor Fuller points out that we are living in an era of great basic changes in our social structure.
It was with the publication in 1940 of The Iaw in Quest of Itself1 that Fuller first established his reputation as a defender of the secular tradition of natural law in legal philosophy. The Law in Quest of Itself marked the start of a series of major statements about the merits of this tradition in jurisprudence.
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The scope of his writings on law included legal philosophy, contracts, mediation, comparative law and legal procedure. As far as can be determined Fuller never commented on abortion in his writings. He believed that law should stand the scrutiny of reason and stressed the importance of good order (1) [emphasis addedl.
"Imagine that you hold in your hand about twenty pieces of cardboard, cut in irregular shapes. Each represents a human being, with his own particular capacities, desires, and interests. The pieces are irregular and varied because men are that way. Before you on a table lies a circle within which you must place all of these pieces. This circle represents the total means of satisfying human desires and realizing human capacities. If you allow the pieces of cardboard to drop within the circle in random order you will find many of them will be stacked on top of one another, leaving blank spaces where there are no pieces -- unused space, in other words. By experimenting and patiently rearranging the pieces, you will find that it is possible to reduce radically the instances in which the pieces overlap and push against one another. There is, in other words, a law already given by the dimensions of the circle and by the dimensions and shapes of these pieces, which determines, in some measure, how they must be arranged to utilize the available space to the fullest advantage and with the least overlapping." Fuller recognized that the actual pieces are not only individual human beings but a complex of human beings and human institutions, which also change shape constantly. Furthermore, that the task is not to arrange the pieces so that they may lie inertly alongside one another, but so they may work together (16).
Lon Fuller criticized legal positivism because he observed that "the analytical positivist sees law as a one-way projection of authority, emanating from an authorized source and imposing itself on the citizen. It does not discern as an essential element in the creation of a legal system any tacit cooperation between lawgiver and citizen -- morally or immorally, justly or unjustly, as the case may be. The positivist philosophy asks of law not what it is or does, but whence it comes. Its basic concern is with the question, 'Who can make the law?'" (5)
Fuller refers to the Bible where the morality of duty includes the command, "Thou shall love your neighbor as yourself.".
Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade and its progeny. Fuller was a professor of general jurisprudence at Harvard Law School for many years until his retirement in 1972. The scope of his writings on law included legal philosophy, contracts, mediation, comparative law and legal procedure. As far as can be determined Fuller never commented on abortion in his writings. He believed that law should stand the scrutiny of reason and stressed the importance of good order (1) [emphasis addedl. He criticized the views of philosophers such as Hans Kelzen, H.L.A. Hart, Ronald Dworkin, and Marshall Cohen. Fuller opposed legal positivism, i.e. the idea that law is no higher than a determined authority; i.e. a sovereign state, or a rule of recognition, is morally neutral, and is merely an instrument of external ends such as utility. (2)
The positivist philosophy asks of law not what it is or does, but whence it comes.
Fuller opposed legal positivism, i.e. the idea that law is no higher than a determined authority; i.e. a sovereign state, or a rule of recognition, is morally neutral, and is merely an instrument of external ends such as utility.