A lawyer who has received a client's confidences cannot repeat them to anyone outside the legal team without the client's consent. In that sense, the privilege is the client's, not the lawyer's—the client can decide to forfeit (or waive) the privilege, but the lawyer cannot.
Preliminary communications between a potential client and a lawyer are normally subject to the attorney-client privilege. That means that lawyers can't disclose what prospective clients reveal in confidence even if the lawyers never ends up representing them. ( In re Auclair, 961 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1992).)
Neither the WSBA nor the RPC’s require a lawyer to retain an entire client file for a specific period of time after the lawyer-client relationship has ended. RPC 1.15B (a) requires that trust account records and related documents be retained for seven years after the events they record.
As far as is reasonably possible, a lawyer is obligated to take steps to maintain a normal lawyer-client relationship even if a client’s capacity to make adequately informed decisions is diminished. RPC 1.14 (a).
[5] Defendant accuses his two trial attorneys of having an irreconcilable conflict of interest with him, because they were appointed by the trial court and received compensation from the State of California, which had an interest in convicting defendant of the crimes charged. This circumstance, defendant asserts, may have prevented defense counsel from vigorously objecting to any errors by the trial court, because of their desire to receive appointments in future cases. Defendant suggests that in the future any appointments of counsel and provisions for their fees "should be managed by some entity such as local and/or the State Bar Association rather than the Courts before whom the appointed counsel is appearing."
Defendant faults the trial court for not appointing independent counsel to assist him in arguing that he was entitled to replacement of his appointed counsel. He argues that because he was young (21 years old at the time of trial) and not well educated (a high school dropout, according to the probation report), he could not clearly articulate the reasons why he believed his attorneys should be replaced. He points out that a trial court must appoint counsel to assist a defendant moving for a new trial on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel whenever "a failure to replace the appointed attorney would substantially impair the right to assistance of counsel ...." (People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 684, 696 [ 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 122, 863 P.2d 192 ]; see also People v. Stewart (1985) 171 Cal. App. 3d 388 [ 217 Cal. Rptr. 306 ].) But Smith holds only that in such situations the trial court should replace the defendant's existing counsel with a new attorney; it does not suggest that a defendant should ever be simultaneously represented by two attorneys, one of whom is challenging the other's competence.
[22] On the charge that defendant murdered Kathryn Roberts, the trial court instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. The court told the jury, however, that voluntary manslaughter was not an option on the count charging defendant with the murder of Donna Roberts.
After Jiy Williams testified that in his telephone conversation with Donna Roberts, she had answered his question about who was with her at the house, defendant moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion, but offered to admonish the jury to disregard Williams's testimony. Defendant asked the court not to do so, fearing that the admonition would have the effect of drawing the jury's attention to this testimony, thus increasing its prejudicial effect.
After defendant testified in his own defense, the prosecutor impeached him by eliciting from him the fact that he had two prior felony convictions for burglary. Defendant now contends that the prosecutor should not have been permitted to use these convictions to impeach him. Because defendant did not object at trial, he is precluded from raising this issue on appeal. (People v. Stewart (1983) 140 Cal. App. 3d 11, 16 [ 189 Cal. Rptr. 141 ]; see People v. Rollo (1977) 20 Cal. 3d 109, 116 [141 Cal. Rptr. 177, 569 P.2d 771].)
Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied each of his three Marsden motions. He argues that the hearings conducted on those motions demonstrated a "significant disagreement as to tactics and strategy" between defendant and his trial counsel, and that there was a "substantial deterioration" of the attorney-client relationship. We perceive no error.
[6] Defendant had two prior convictions for burglary. During voir dire, pursuant to a stipulation by the parties, the trial court told the prospective [15 Cal. 4th 1030] jurors about one of these prior burglary convictions. After the jury had been selected, but before the prosecutor made his opening statement, the court read the information to the jury. Included in the charges against defendant was the offense of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. (§ 12021.) While explaining this charge to the jury, the trial court stated: "At the ... request of both counsel, you have ... learned ... that the defendant had previously been convicted of a charge of robbery and possession of a firearm by a previous conviction." (Italics added.) Defendant, however, had no prior convictions for robbery or possession of a firearm. The prosecutor immediately pointed out the court's mistake, saying, "No, previous conviction of burglary." The court then stated, "Previously been convicted of a count of burglary. Strike that, I have no information about a previous conviction for robbery."
The most basic principle underlying the lawyer-client relationship is that lawyer-client communications are privileged, or confidential. This means that lawyers cannot reveal clients' oral or written statements (nor lawyers' own statements to clients) to anyone, including prosecutors, employers, friends, or family members, ...
Heidi tells her lawyer that the drugs belonged to her , and that she bought them for the first time during a period of great stress in her life, just after she lost her job. Heidi authorizes her lawyer to reveal this information to the D.A., hoping to achieve a favorable plea bargain.
Example: Benny Wilson is charged with possession of stolen merchandise. The day after discussing the case with his lawyer, Benny discusses it with a neighbor. As long as Benny does not say something to his neighbor like, "Here's what I told my lawyer yesterday…," the attorney-client communications remain confidential.
Heidi authorized her lawyer to reveal her confidential statement to the D.A. But a statement made for the purpose of plea bargaining is also generally confidential, so the D.A. cannot refer to it at trial. Example: Same case. Soon after her arrest, Heidi speaks to her mother in jail.
Lawyer-client communications are confidential only if they are made in a context where it would be reasonable to expect that they would remain confidential. ( Katz v. U.S., U.S. Sup. Ct. 1967.)
If a jailer monitors a phone call and overhears a prisoner make a damaging admission to the prisoner's lawyer, the jailer can probably testify to the defendant's statement in court.
Blabbermouth defendants waive (give up) the confidentiality of lawyer-client communications when they disclose those statements to someone else (other than a spouse, because a separate privilege exists for spousal communications; most states also recognize a priest-penitent privilege). Defendants have no reasonable expectation of privacy in conversations they reveal to others.
If the lawyer publishes any fee information authorized under Rule 7.1 in a publication that has no fixed date for publication of a succeeding issue, the lawyer is bound by any representation made therein for a reasonable period of time after publication, but in no event less than 90 days. Rule 7.1 (l)- (n).
A. A lawyer or law firm must retain copies of all advertisements for a period of not less than three years following initial dissemination, except that copies of advertisements contained in a computer-accessed communication shall be retained for not less than one year. Rule 7.1 (k).
A. General summary. A lawyer generally may withdraw from the representation when the client fails to pay the lawyer's fees, but must take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of the client. See Rule 1.16 (c) (5), (e).
A lawyer in private practice cannot practice under a trade name or a name that is misleading as to the identity of the lawyer or lawyers practicing under such a name, or containing names other than those of one or more of the lawyers in the firm. Rule 7.5 (b). A. Rule 7.5 (b). A.
A. Communications to existing clients or other lawyers are not advertisements. Rule 1.0 (a). A lawyer may write for publication on legal topics (or speak publicly) without affecting the right to accept employment so long as the lawyer does not undertake to give individual advice. Rule 7.1 (r).
No. The method of compensation “is not relevant” to whether a lawyer may be designated as "of counsel.” N.Y. City Formal Op. 1996-8. An attorney who is paid “ per diem ” and “does not work exclusively for the firm” may be designated as “of counsel” to the firm. Id.
Under Rule 1.9 (c) (2), a lawyer may not reveal confidential information of the former client protected by Rule 1.6 except as the Rules otherwise permit or require with respect to a current client.
The duty of confidentiality prevents lawyers from even informally discussing information related to their clients' cases with others. They must keep private almost all information related to representation of the client, even if that information didn't come from the client.
The attorney-client privilege is a rule that preserves the confidentiality of communications between lawyers and clients. Under that rule, attorneys may not divulge their clients' secrets, nor may others force them to. The purpose of the privilege is to encourage clients ...
The Client's Privilege. Generally, the attorney-client privilege applies when: an actual or potential client communicates with a lawyer regarding legal advice. the lawyer is acting in a professional capacity (rather than, for example, as a friend), and. the client intended the communications to be private and acted accordingly.
Example: In a civil suit regarding allegedly stolen funds, the judge orders the defense to turn over to the plaintiff documentation of conversations between the defendant and his attorney. The defense argues that the attorney-client privilege applies, and that the documents are protected. But the documents relate to plans between ...
Under that rule, attorneys may not divulge their clients' secrets, nor may others force them to. The purpose of the privilege is to encourage clients to openly share information with their lawyers and to let lawyers provide effective representation.
If someone were to surreptitiously record the conversation, that recording would probably be inadmissible in court.
No matter who hears or learns about a communication, however, the lawyer typically remains obligated not to repeat it.
This dilemma raises complex questions of legal ethics, and due care must be taken to ensure compliance with applicable requirements in Washington, which in some ways differ from the requirements of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. A careful review of Washington RPC 3.3, 1.6, and 1.16 is recommended.
Unclaimed funds result from either a balance left in the trust account for a client a lawyer can no longer locate or from outstanding checks that the lawyer is unable to reissue. Any unclaimed trust account funds must be handled according to the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act, RCW 63.29.
A lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if the withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interest of the client. RPC 1.16 (b) (1).
Washington’s RPC offer little specific guidance about the maintenance, storage, or destruction of client files. RPC 1.15A and 1.15B require lawyers to safeguard client property.
At the conclusion of a representation, the client file generated in the course of the representation must be turned over to the client at the client’s request. If the lawyer wishes to retain copies for the lawyer’s use, the copies must be made at the lawyer’s expense unless charges were specified in the lawyer-client fee agreement.
Lawyers can give their clients gifts, subject to some qualifications. Except for expenses of litigation, a lawyer shall not “advance or guarantee financial assistance to a client” if there is contemplated or pending litigation. RPC 1.8 (e).
How do you withdraw without telling the court why you need to do so? The golden ticket is to state that professional considerations require you to withdraw.
If you’ve ever received a letter from opposing counsel threatening to file a motion for sanctions or a disciplinary complaint, or refer a matter for criminal prosecution, you’ve likely raised the question of whether the threat violates that attorney’s ethical obligations. The answer, of course, depends on the circumstances. Primarily, a threat is impermissible if it does not relate to the subject matter of the dispute and is communicated solely to gain leverage in a civil dispute or negotiation.
Prior to 1983, the ABA Model Code contained a rule stating, “A lawyer shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.”. This rule was withdrawn in 1983 and was not retained in the ABA Model Rules.
Accordingly, it is permissible to advise opposing counsel that you will file a motion for discovery sanctions if the matter does not settle, provided that you believe the sanctions are warranted and the settlement demand on the table is reasonable in relation to what your client might obtain at trial.
Generally, an Indiana lawyer may present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal charges to obtain an advantage in a civil matter if: The criminal charges (or ethical charges) are related to the civil matter; The lawyer reasonably believes the charges are well-grounded in fact and warranted by law; and.